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DIVINE INTERVENTION 
Evan Fales 
Some philosophers deny that science can investigate the supernatural- specifi-
cally, the nature and actions of God. If a divine being is atemporal, then, 
indeed, this seems plausible - but only, I shall argue, because such a being 
could not causally interact with anything. Here I discuss in detail two major 
attempts, those of Stump and Kretzmann, and of Leftow, to make sense of 
theophysical causation on the supposition that God is eternal. These views are 
carefully worked out, and their failures are instructive for any attempt to rec-
oncile eternality with causal efficacy. I conclude by arguing that if knowledge 
of God is possible, in virtue of His effects upon the world, then it is science 
that must play the preeminent role in producing that knowledge. 
liTo say it for all my colleagues and for the umpteenth millionth 
time ... : science simply cannot (by its legitimate methods) adju-
dicate the issue of God's possible superintendence of nature. 
We neither affirm nor deny it... Science can work only with nat-
uralistic explanations; it can neither affirm nor deny other types 
of actors (like God) in other spheres (the moral realm, for exam-
ple). Stephen Jay Gould l 
Ever since Copernicus' publication of De Revolutionibus and Galileo's 
confrontation with Cardinal Bellarmine, the skirmishes between science 
and religion have played a central role in the arena of Western intellec-
tual life. If the above passage from Gould strikes a familiar chord, it is 
because it reflects one sort of modus vivendi between the two which has a 
distinguished history. With roots in Cartesian dualism, it received ener-
getic development in those strands of liberal Protestant theology that 
were influenced by Kierkegaard.2 
Put most crudely, this way of reconciling science and religion divides 
the world into two distinct realms, one the spiritual realm, the other, the 
spatiotemporal world of material things. Over the first, theology has 
proper dominion; over the second, science. It is not only liberal theolo-
gians, but also many scientists, who see in this division of labor a way to 
achieve harmony - or at least peace - between the two enterprises. 
This bifurcation of domains has consequences. On the side of theolo-
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gy, it ultimately means renouncing - indeed, repudiating - much of nat-
ural theology. On the side of science, it means remaining as discretely 
silent as possible about the religious implications (since allegedly there 
aren't any) of developments in science.' But there is, as I hope to show, a 
further, though related, consequence - and one which theologians, at 
least, may find unpalatable. 
Many conservative Protestants share with their liberal counterparts a 
skeptical attitude toward natural theology;' but they tend to be far more 
ready to criticize science when they perceive threats to their religious 
commitments. To cite just one instance, Alvin Plantinga has recently 
engaged in extensive polemics against the neo-Darwinian theory of evo-
lution, and has urged Christian scientists to develop scientific theories 
that are informed by their religious commitments.' To allow that such 
conflicts can arise with respect to what is true of the physical world is, 
however, to be committed to the empirical testability of at least some 
religious systems of thought. It is, in fact, to allow that empirical find-
ings can, via scientific inference, be brought to bear upon religious mat-
ters. 6 From a different direction, conservatives have also been eager to 
proclaim and defend the legitimacy of revelation - that is, more or less 
immediate perceptual awareness of the divine.7 
Underlying these various refusals to isolate religious concerns from 
empirical and scientific ones is, I think, a single fundamental issue. This 
fundamental question is whether God ever acts upon or causally interacts 
with the world. Clearly, the Jewish and Christian traditions have long 
held that God interacts with the world in a multitude of ways,s not only 
by creating it in the first place but, more especially, by intervening in spe-
cial ways to direct the course of human history and to win human hearts. 
There is, to be sure, a significant strand of thought - deism - which 
seeks to minimize the role of the deity in mundane affairs. But even 
deism holds that God created the world. At the other extreme is the 
view that God's ever-present sustaining activity is a necessary condition 
for the continued existence of the world and of every contingent particu-
lar. So the stakes for both theism and science are high. 
In this paper I want to explore the question whether it is possible and 
proper for science to investigate religious claims concerning the exis-
tence and nature of God. Is Gould correct or is he mistaken? I shall not 
attempt to settle that question; but I will argue for the following theses: 
(1) If it is at all possible to obtain empirical evidence concerning God, 
then there is no reason why the supernatural could not, and should not, 
be a subject of scientific investigation. (2) If God acts upon or interacts 
(has causal relations) with the world, then there is no reason in principle 
why we couldn't obtain empirical evidence of that fact. And (3) one 
ground (perhaps the only plausible ground) for denying the possibility 
of such causal interaction stems from the doctrine of divine eternity. 
If God is eternal - that is, if His mode of existence places Him outside 
of time altogether - then causal interaction of any kind with the world is 
impossible. In that case, the issue would be settled in favor of Gould, 
but only at the cost of denying divine superintendence of nature and 
humankind. Moreover, any sort of empirical knowledge of God would 
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then be beyond our reach. The only remaining question for theology 
would be whether strictly a priori knowledge of the divine were some-
how possible.9 
It is unclear whether divine-mundane (theophysical) causal connec-
tions are possible on the major alternative conception of God - one 
according to which He is non-spatial and sempiternal. lO But if God can 
cause mundane happenings - and theists clearly think He does - then 
Gould is wrong, and we should confront the fact that theism has empiri-
cal consequences. If, for example, a particular theology implies that God 
would not have brought about the existence of our species via the 
processes of Darwinian evolution, then the empirical evidence which 
indicates that our existence was brought about in that way counts 
against that theology. In general, any mundane effect which a theology 
attributes to a divine action can be investigated to ascertain (a) whether 
it exists at all; (b) whether, given its existence, a causal chain can be 
traced backwards from the effect which points to a supra-mundane ori-
gin; and (c) whether, conversely, a purely naturalistic causal explanation 
is available. ll To do this is, prima facie, to engage in empirical theory-test-
ing of the most ordinary scientific sort. 
I shall proceed, then, as follows. First, I shall examine several con-
temporary attempts - primarily those of Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann, and Brian Leftow - to show how theophysical causation is 
possible on the assumption that God is an atemporal agent. Second, I 
shall consider the possibility of sempiternal non-spatial agency. Third, 
granting theophysical causation, I shall argue that there are no proper 
grounds for excluding investigations of such causal connections from 
the domain of scientific investigation. I shall argue, in fact, that since the 
scientific disciplines have provided us with the most sophisticated tools 
we have for investigating causal processes, they deserve a certain pride 
of place in such investigations. 
1. Can an eternal God cause anything? 
Is God an active being, or something more like the Platonic Form of 
the Good, both unmoved and unmoving? Certainly, there is a powerful 
intuition that if God is neither spatial nor temporal, then He must be an 
abstract being, or something very like that. And then, intuitively, God 
could no more cause something than could, say, the number four or the 
proposition that two plus two equals four. Richard Gale and Nelson 
Pike both dismiss eternal agency by direct appeal to this intuitionY It is 
an intuition that deserves to be taken seriously: much in the way of 
philosophical reasoning rests, in the end, upon such basic intuitions. 
But God is supposed to be a substance, which raises questions about 
whether there can be atemporal, aspatial substances; and whether, if 
there can be, any abstract entities are substances. Besides, since much 
has been done by way of attempts to elucidate the nature of the divine 
eternity, more needs to be said if this intuition is to be sustained. 
In a series of papers, Stump and Kretzmann13 have presented a con-
ception of divine eternity which they take to be compatible with thea-
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physical agency. Initially, their conception of divine eternity was 
intended (in part) to help make sense of theophysical causation, by 
showing how that sort of causation could accommodate the idea that a 
cause must bear a temporal relation, or at least something like a tempo-
ral relation, to its effect. 14 In particular, if A is a proximate cause of B, we 
are strongly inclined to think that A must either immediately precede, or 
be simultaneous with, B. In the case of divine-mundane causation, 
Stump and Kretzmann opt for a relation of simultaneity, which they call 
ET (eternal-temporal) simultaneity. This can't be a strictly temporal rela-
tion, since one of its relata isn't a time or a temporal entity at all. Rather, 
God is supposed to occupy an eternal frame of reference in which every-
thing is present to Him all-at-once (but at no time in any temporal 
series). God's existence has a (nontemporal) unlimited duration, but one 
not divisible into parts. IS Because Stump and Kretzmann take presence to 
characterize the divine life; and because they take every temporal occur-
rence to be present to God, but not sequentially, it is natural to suppose 
that every mundane event is ET-simultaneous with a single, timeless act 
of awareness of God's. 
To spell this out, Stump and Kretzmann take an important cue from 
the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) - namely, the idea that simultane-
ity is not a two-place relation between events or states of affairs, but a 
three-place relation between these and a frame of reference. Thus, they 
think of the eternity which God's life occupies as God's frame of refer-
ence, and proceed to define ET -simultaneity as follows: 
(ET) For every x and y, where x and y range over entities and 
events, x and yare ET-simultaneous iff: 
(i) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and 
(ij) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x 
and yare both present - i.e., either x is eternally present and y is 
observed as temporally present; or vice versa; and 
(iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal 
reference frames, x and yare both present - i.e., either x is 
observed as eternally present and y is temporally present, or 
vice versa. 16 
Stump and Kretzmann go on to remark that ET -simultaneity is a sym-
metric relation but not transitive. Thus, from the fact that Caesar's 
crossing the Rubicon and my writing this are simultaneously observed 
by God (and are each ET-simultaneous with the one Divine Act), it does 
not follow that they are (ET-) simultaneous with one another in any tem-
poral reference frame. 
It is not entirely clear how literally Stump and Kretzmann mean their 
appeal to STR to be taken as a basis for the extension of the notion of the 
relativity of simultaneity to the eternal "reference frame." If the relativi-
ty of ET -simultaneity is introduced with the intention that it will help 
give sense to the notion of theophysical causation by providing some-
thing like a temporal relation between cause and effect, then the appeal 
to STR is unhelpful. For in STR, the rationale for relativizing simultane-
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ity derives from a consideration of how measurements of time within 
reference frames can be compared; i.e., compatibly with the causal con-
straints on the transmission of information-bearing signals from one 
location to another. But this means that the Lorentz transformations pre-
suppose the possibility of causal interactions (conforming to certain laws) 
between items at rest within different inertial frames. So an STR-like 
rationale can hardly be used to establish the possibility of causal interac-
tions between the spatiotemporal world and God.17 
In the light of various objections, including possibly this one, Stump 
and Kretzmann have more recently modified their definition of ET-
simultaneity, as follows: 
(ET') For every x and every y, x and yare ET-simultaneous iff: 
(i) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa (for conve-
nience, let x be eternal and y temporal); and 
(ii) with respect to some A in the unique eternal reference 
frame, x and yare both present - i.e., (a) x is in the eternal pre-
sent with respect to A, (b) y is in the temporal present, and (c) 
both x and yare situated with respect to A in such a way that A 
can enter into direct and immediate causal relations with each of 
them ... ; and 
(iii) with respect to some B in one of the infinitely many tempo-
ral reference frames, x and yare both present - Le., (a) x is in the 
eternal present, (b) y is at the same time as B, and (c) both x and 
yare situated with respect to B in such a way that B can enter 
into direct and immediate causal relations with each of them ... Y 
The first thing to say about this revision is that it gives up the project 
of illuminating or helping to explain the possibility of theophysical cau-
sation; instead, it straightforwardly assumes that possibility. Stump and 
Kretzmann see no problem with this assumption; but that is surely to fly 
in the face of the intuition that there is something intrinsically problem-
atic about a causal relation between relata which stand in no temporal 
relation to one another. Moreover, (ET') - like (ET) - appears to be inco-
herent if we remove what is problematic by assimilating theophysical 
causation to the physical causal processes which constrain simultaneity 
judgments in STR. 
As noted, ET-simultaneity is (on either definition) a nontransitive 
relation. That is what prevents the inference to the conclusion that 
Caesar is crossing the Rubicon as I now write. But the non-transitivity 
of ET-simultaneity is the result of a formal feature of the definitions (ET) 
and (ET') - namely, the requirement that one term of the relation be an 
eternal being, and the other temporal, together with what proves to be a 
conception of the eternal reference frame that has no real analogue in 
STR. This last fact renders 5TR essentially useless in understanding 
divine/world causal relations. 
We can bring this observation into sharper relief by constructing a 
relation, simultaneity*, that is modeled upon ET-simultaneity, but with 
the formal transitivity-blocking feature removed, and with A identified 
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as the intended eternal being, God: 
(S*) For every x and y, x and yare simultaneous* iff: 
(i) either x and yare both temporal, or one is temporal and the 
other not, or both are eternal; and 
(ii) with respect to God in the unique eternal reference frame, x 
and yare both present - i.e., (a) each is either in the eternal pre-
sent or is in the temporal present with respect to God, and (b) 
both x and yare situated with respect to God in such a way that 
God can enter into direct and immediate causal relations with 
each of them. 
Now (S*) defines a transitive relation; so if Caesar's crossing the 
Rubicon and my writing are each simultaneous* with the eternal Now, 
then they are simultaneous* with each other. That is surely odd; but 
perhaps it does nothing more than reflect the fact that all things are 
"simultaneous" in "the eyes of God." 
However in STR, all event-pairs that are locally simultaneous in any 
frame of reference are simultaneous in every frame. An event is locally 
simultaneous with another if the two are simultaneous and occur in the 
same place. But the invariance of local simultaneity across temporal ref-
erence frames is a result of the fact that there is no transmission time for 
signals travelling between spatially unseparated points. Since God is 
taken to be causally proximate to every spatiotemporal position, his 
actions might be supposed to be locally simultaneous with everything 
that happens: what else could causal proximity come to? 
Would it then follow, from the transitivity of simultaneity*, that there 
is a temporal reference-frame in which Caesar's crossing and my writing 
occur simultaneously? That depends upon what it is for them both to be 
temporally present to God, and unfortunately, the best Stump and 
Kretzmann can do is to try to explain this analogically. The analogy is 
an essentially spatial one. We are to imagine two parallel lines, the 
upper representing eternity, the lower one, time. The present (temporal) 
moment is represented by a spot of light moving along the lower line. 
The upper line is lighted all at once (and, one must suppose in the analo-
gy, always). Then we are told that "from the viewpoint of a being per-
sisting in the eternal present, each temporal instant is ET -simultaneous 
with the eternal present, but only insofar as that instant is temporally 
present, so that from the eternal being's point of view, the entire time 
line is lighted at once."19 
It is possible to glean from this what some of the formal features of 
the relation of being temporally present to God are, but when the spatial 
analogy is removed, it is hard to see how this picture could be brought 
into substantive conformity with the requirement that God has immedi-
ate causal access to everything, at least along the lines that form the very 
basis of Einstein's reasoning to the conclusion that simultaneity is a 
three-place relation. One way to achieve this conformity would be to 
suppose that it does not take any time for causal influence to travel from 
God to events in the world, or between those events which are the 
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divine thoughts occurring within the divine eternity. But to say that 
would either presuppose the very concept of (ET) simultaneity that is 
being defined, or to take the relation to be one of temporal simultaneity, 
with the consequence that Caesar's action and mine are (temporally) 
simultaneous - presumably, in every reference-frame. For if God's 
immediate causal presence to every spacetime point entails his temporal 
simultaneity with that point, then there can be no temporal separation 
between events. 
What this brings out is the point - with which Stump and Kretzmann 
will surely concur - that the eternal frame of reference is not really any-
thing like the temporal reference frames of STR. But then the helpful-
ness of the STR analogy begins to appear illusive. In short, temporal dis-
tinctions collapse if one makes the mistake of pushing the analogy with 
STR seriously. So this can't be right. But otherwise, we are left with a 
conception of being temporally present to God which is not only impos-
sible to flesh out except via poor analogies, but which cannot be 
employed in a way that generates a real parallel between the concept of 
ET-simultaneity and the concept of simultaneity employed by STR. 
Stump and Kretzmann might object that, although there is such a 
relation as ET-simultaneity, there is no such relation as simultaneity*. 
But since simultaneity* is constructed from temporal simultaneity and 
the constituents of ET-simultaneity, I can see no reason for supposing 
that the former doesn't exist if the latter does. I conclude that ET-simul-
taneity cannot help to elucidate the notion of theophysical causation if 
God is an eternal being. 
But perhaps the more sophisticated approach of Leftow,2° which pro-
ceeds along roughly similar lines, can be of more help. Leftow, like 
Stump and Kretzmann, allows that the divine eternity may possess 
extension without being divisible into parts; and like them, he conceives 
the relation between God's mode of being and the world's in terms of 
reference frames. Moreover, if the role of STR in the Stump/Kretzmann 
formulation is somewhat equivocal, it is clearly central to Leftow's. 
Like Stump and Kretzmann, Leftow feels the tug of the intuition that 
a proximate causal relation implies something like spatiotemporal conti-
guity. But if ET-simultaneity cannot perform the task of providing this, 
how is it to be understood? 
In order to avoid having to invoke a concept like ET-simultaneity, 
Leftow develops an idea he finds in Anselm, according to which tempo-
ral things are present to God by existing, with God, in eternity (even as 
they exist also in time). Leftow's argument for this conclusion begins 
with what he calls the Zero Thesis: 
(ZT) The distance between God and every spatial creature is zero.21 
From (ZT), Leftow infers that God is spatially contiguous with every 
spatial location. From that it follows, further, that nothing is in motion 
relative to God, since its distance from God cannot change. Now consid-
er the thesis: 
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(M) There is no change of any sort involving spatial, material 
entities unless there is also a change of place, i.e., a motion 
involving some material entity.22 
If (M) is true, then it follows that there is no change of any sort which 
spatial things undergo relative to God. But now Leftow invokes a princi-
ple which he derives from the Minkowski representation of the spatio-
temporal framework of STR, viz., that every temporal thing is also spatial 
(which, Leftow holds, follows from the fact that temporal separations in 
one reference frame can be (partially) transformed into spatial ones in 
another frame).23 But if all spatial objects are at rest and changeless with 
respect to God, then, Leftow concludes, they must all be locatable in a 
reference frame (eternity) in which they are all locally simultaneous. 
We can think of this argument as an ingenious way of establishing a 
transformation-relation between temporal reference-frames and eternity, 
without having to rely upon considerations deriving from causal inter-
actions, or signal transmission, between them. I shall not comment 
upon all of the steps of this argument/4 but the pivotal Zero Thesis 
seems clearly false. 25 From the fact that there is no spatial distance 
between a spatial location L and God, it hardly follows that the two are 
contiguous, any more than it follows from the fact that something is not 
yellow that it must be some other color, or from the fact that a fish is nei-
ther larger nor smaller than the number four, that it must be the same 
size as that number.26 
Leftow has traded too easily on the disputed semantic relations 
between interior and exterior negation. This distinction is illustrated by 
the difference between saying that it's not the case that this chair is 
happy, and claiming that the chair is unhappy. The former is true; the 
latter is neither meaningless nor straightforwardly false, but it certainly 
isn't, for all that, true: it involves a category mistake. Some might say it 
has no truth-value.27 
Similarly, to concede that it's not the case that God (or the number 
four) lies at any positive distance from this chair is not the same as to 
affirm that the distance is zero, a claim which could be true only if there 
were some metric defined on a space, with respect to which the measure 
of the distance between God and the chair is zero. The claim that God 
lies a zero distance from the chair is neither meaningless not straightfor-
wardly false - but it is certainly not true if God is non-spatial, and its 
truth certainly isn't entailed by its non-falsity. 
The claim that God does not lie at any positive distance from the chair 
is plausible only if construed in terms of external negation: that it is not 
the case that there is any positive distance between God and the chair, or 
any other spatial location. But neither is it the case that there is a zero 
distance between these. So the Zero Thesis can't be identified with the 
true external-negation claim. Even if one denies that a zero distance is a 
"positive" distance, it is the limit of a converging series of positive dis-
tances - e.g., 1 meter, 1/2 meter, 1/4 meter, . .. And there can be no 
such relation as that between a non-spatial God and any point in space. 
But Leftow needs that sense of distance to argue that nothing moves 
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relative to God in some reference-frame, e.g. when he says, "But the dis-
tance between God and any creature is always the same: every part of 
God is always at zero spatial distance from any creature, in any frame of 
reference." [my italics]28 To speak of zero distance in a reference-frame is 
to use the metric (or at least spatial) sense of zero distance, the sense in 
which it is the limit of a series of positive distances. But to construe (ZT) 
plausibly, with the negation external, undermines the argument from 
(ZT) & (M) & STR to the co-presence of all things in God's eternal refer-
ence-frame. 
Now God's being outside of time has consequences which parallel 
those for His aspatiality: in particular, it ceases to be intelligible that 
God should be cotemporal with, or temporally contiguous to, any tem-
poral item. This makes the relation of theophysical causation unintelli-
gible. 
But even if Leftow were right, how would this illuminate theophysi-
cal causation? Here I quote two passages: 
... perhaps we can argue that an eternal entity acts on those tem-
poral entities that are present with it in eternity, and these 
actions have consequences for temporal entities as they exist in 
time. (We could say that actions in eternity are prior to conse-
quences in time not temporally but ''by nature.") Perhaps, that 
is, a time-less deity need not act on temporal things in time to 
act on temporal things... Of course, these moves leave us the 
task of explaining causal relations between timeless and tempo-
ral entities in eternity. But perhaps we can make headway on 
this via counterfactuals expressing dependence.29 
And in a later passage: 
In the reference frame of eternity, the time at which the 
[divine] action [of sustaining a state-of-affairs (SOA)] occurs = 
the time at which the SOA is sustained = eternity. In other refer-
ence frames this is not so. Rather, in these, the time at which the 
SOA is sustained is some particular point in time, and the action 
nonetheless occurs at eternity. But we can accept this with 
equanimity. STR allows that events or states simultaneous in 
one frame of reference may be nonsimultaneous in others. 
One could urge in response that STR also insists that there are 
the same temporal relations between causes in all frames of ref-
erence. But the foundation of this relativistic demand is the 
finite velocity of causal signals... As divine causality is not 
physical and does not work by the transmission of a physical 
signal, it escapes this requirement though we can nonetheless 
apply in its case a conceptual move (the relativity of simultaneity) 
that special relativity shows to be legitimate. 3D 
Since the spatial entities that are present with God in eternity are 
identically the same items that are temporally located, it's hard to see 
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how God's acting upon them "in eternity" could be distinguished from 
his acting on them "in time," or what sort of a consequence-relation is 
supposed to hold between an entity's being acted upon in eternity and 
its being acted upon in time. Clearly, Leftow can't mean that some state 
of a thing qua-present-in-eternity causes some change in its temporal 
state. So all this can come to is that God's action isn't temporal, 
although its effects are. This, however, marks no advance at all. 
Does the second passage help? It supposedly addresses the question 
of the temporal relation between a divine action and its (immediate) 
effects. It says that, relative to temporal reference-frames, the action and 
its effects aren't simultaneous. But then, what is their temporal relation? 
Or is Leftow prepared to accept the Zero Thesis with respect to spatial 
contiguity, while refusing to apply it here even though, evidently, there 
is no temporal distance between God's doings and their effects? And in 
any case, the conceptual move by which STR introduces the relativity of 
simultaneity makes that relativity legitimate precisely and only because 
the velocity of signal transmission is finite. It avails nothing to say that 
divine action does not rely upon the transmission of physical signals, for 
whatever it relies upon, either there is a lapse of time between the act 
and its effect, or there is no such lapse. Leftow apparently intends the 
latter. So again, if God's actions are locally simultaneous with their 
effects, all temporal distinctions collapse.31 
The Stump /Kretzmann/Leftow approach then seems hopeless. But 
Leftow still has one arrow in his quiver. We can draw it out by reflect-
ing that perhaps the hypothesis ascribing causal powers to an eternal 
God has been given already too long a leash. Isn't there a much shorter 
way with this hypothesis, a way which consists of reflecting on what we 
mean by "a causes b," and seeing that the temporal relation is a con-
stituent of our analysis of that claim? If so, then for any b, "Eternal God 
causes b" is analytically false. 
The trouble with this short way is, in part, that judgments of analyticity 
are notoriously vulnerable; even if "our concept" of causation incorpo-
rates a temporal relation, maybe that just shows the concept to be inade-
quate or too limited. Nevertheless, partisans of divine eternity are severe-
ly restricted in the analyses of causality to which they can appeal, once 
hope of including a temporal or quasi-temporal relation is abandoned. 
A survey of analyses of the causal relation from Hume to the present 
reveals few candidates.32 Hume himself was prepared to relinquish spa-
tial contiguity (in part because of a concern with psychophysical causa-
tion); but temporal contiguity he wisely retains. The exceptions are 
analyses which take seriously the reality of the causal connection in the 
singular case, often focussing on the notion that the connection is a nec-
essaryone. 
There are two such analyses which deserve attention. One is the 
Armstrong-Tooley-Oretske view which grounds causal connection in a 
second-order relation between universals; thus N(F, G), a relation of 
"necessitation" between being an F and being a G, grounds the produc-
tion, by instantiators of F, of instances of G. Armstrong (on whose ver-
sion of the view I shall focus) says little about what sort of temporal rela-
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tion must obtain between an F and the G it produces. But Armstrong is 
a dedicated naturalist: for him, there are no states of affairs, or causal 
connections between them, outside of space and time.33 
Still, why shouldn't supernaturalists help themselves to the essential 
idea of the Armstrong-Tooley-Dretske analysis, developing it to suit 
their purposes? That is, if F is a divine attribute and G describes a mun-
dane state of affairs, why shouldn't a connection N between them serve 
to underwrite theophysical causation? An initial resistance to this idea 
may come from the reflection that, if N(F, G) grounds the law that all F's 
are G's, then God's operations would appear to be subject to natural law. 
Armstrong himself has wavered on whether, on his theory, a causal rela-
tion entails the existence of a law. In the end, he comes down on the 
positive side of this question. 
But even if Armstrong is right (as I think he is) about this, why should 
not divine operations be in this way subject to natural law? After all, 
that is compatible with it's being up to God whether the connection N(F, 
G) obtains (though - on pain of regress - he can't be said to cause this sec-
ond-order state of affairs'4); and compatible with it's being God's free 
decision whether or not He exemplifies F.35 
So suppose God eternally exemplifies some property F - say, the 
property of commanding that spatiotemporal particular a exemplify G at 
time t. Then we can invoke Armstrong's connection N to explain what it 
is for these two states of affairs to be causally connected. 
Unfortunately, there is a difficulty for this strategy: how is God to 
gain a "fix" on time t? To do that, God would have to set up a temporal 
reference frame. We do this by observing clocks, sending signals to 
other observers, and the like. But all that presupposes causal interac-
tion. Unless God has some informational contact with His world which 
allows Him to distinguish times, it is impossible to see how He can situ-
ate - or even intend to situate - a given sort of state of affairs at a given 
time. I do not see how such contact is to be made intelligible except by 
invoking causal connections. To say that God "directly apprehends" or 
"intuits" spatiotemporal objects or frames of reference, as some have, is 
just to wave one's hands. What is it for God to have such an 
"intuition"?36 
I shall return to the matter of a divinely established temporal refer-
ence frame; but first, let us examine the second sort of theory of causa-
tion to which an eternalist like Leftow might appeal. Both Leftow and 
Paul Helm37 suggest that divine causation might be made intelligible in 
terms of a counterfactual analysis of causation. Leftow38 gives this idea 
its most sophisticated development, adapting David Lewis' analysis of 
causation, viz.: 
(CD) e is causally dependent on c = df. were c to occur, e would 
occur (in symbols, co~e), and were c to not occur, e would not 
occur.39 
Since Leftow is here considering what it is for God timelessly to sus-
tain in existence a temporal being, he employs (CD) to formulate the fol-
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lowing definition of a timeless sustaining relation: 
(5*) A timelessly sustains B = df. (i) A and B occur contingently, 
(ii) A occurs timelessly, (iii) B occurs continuously over more 
than one temporal position, (iv) in every nonactual world W such 
that no world is more like the actual world than W, A occurs only 
if B occurs continuously over more than one temporal position, 
and (v) were A not to occur, then if B's continuance is not 
overdetermined or redundantly caused, B would not do SO.40 
Clauses (iv) and (v) spell out Lewis' analysis of the relevant counter-
factuals, though, obviously, more must be done to eliminate the causal 
terms from (v) in favor of further counterfactuals.41 Is this strategy of 
Leftow's successful? 
Whether it is so depends, in the first place, upon whether a counter-
factual analysis of causation can be defended, a matter which, as Leftow 
concedes, remains to be decided." But in any case, the counterfactual 
analysis has a feature which may make theists uncomfortable. Because 
the truth conditions for counterfactuals are often vague, so also, on this 
analysis, will the truth-values of causal judgments be. Lewis accepts this 
consequence; but theists may be unwilling to allow that it's va;;:ue 
whether God is a cause of a given state of affairs or not. Suppose you 
believe that God created the best possible world, and you believe God 
did so because (among other things) He is perfectly good. Then (on 
Lewis' view) you believe that if God hadn't created this world, He'd 
have been less than perfect. But what are the truth conditions for that 
counterfactual? Do they, e.g., depend upon whether the divine com-
mand theory of ethics is true? Or perhaps, alternatively, you believe 
that if God hadn't created this world, this world wouldn't have been the 
best possible one - an equally hard claim to specify truth conditions for. 
In general: "God's commanding x causes x to occur" entails "If God 
hadn't commanded x then, other things being equal, x would have failed 
to occur." But what other things are being supposed to be equal? The 
indefiniteness of this affects counterfactuals of divine action, just as it 
affects more mundane counterfactuals.43 
Vagueness aside, there is a more serious problem in store for theists. 
It concerns what Lewis calls the problem of ef£ects.44 Suppose that c 
causes e, and that, under the circumstances, c was bound to cause e.4S 
Then Lewis' analysis gives the unwanted result that e also causes c. 
Lewis blocks the inference by flatly denying the troublesome counterfac-
tuals. He says, 
If e had been absent, it is not that c would have been absent... 
Rather, c would have occurred just as it did but would have 
failed to cause e. It is less of a departure from actuality to get rid 
of e by holding c fixed and giving up some or other of the laws 
and circumstances in virtue of which c would not have failed to 
cause e, rather than to hold those laws and circumstances fixed 
and get rid of e by going back and abolishing its cause c:6 
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We can see why theists can't accept this solution47 by considering 
God's creation of the world. Suppose God's command "Let there be 
alpha" was the sufficient cause for the coming into existence of alpha 
(the world). Then since, if the world were to exist, God would have 
commanded it, and if it were to fail to exist, God would have failed to 
command it (i.e. since, according to theists, if the world had not existed, 
this could not involve the supposition that God commanded its exis-
tence but failed to bring it about), it appears to follow on Lewis' theory 
that the coming into existence of the world is a cause (indeed, the cause) 
of God's so commanding. Lewis blocks the inference by denying the 
last-mentioned counterfactual. But no theist could countenance such a 
denial; to do so would be to deny God's necessary omnipotence. 
Leftow thinks he has another solution to the problem of effects. As he 
points out, clauses (ii) and (iii) of (5*) prevent cases of reverse depen-
dence: a temporal being cannot timelessly sustain anything. 
But alas, the salvation afforded by clauses (ii) and (iii) is illusory, for 
reasons analogous to those which defeat Stump and Kretzmann's appeal 
to the non-transitivity of ET -simultaneity. To see why, consider the rela-
tion causes*, which I define as follows: 
(C*) A causes* B = df. (i) A and B occur contingently, (ii) in 
every nonactual world W such that no world is more like the 
actual world than W, A occurs only if B occurs, and (iii) were A 
not to occur, then if B's occurrence is not overdetermined or 
redundantly caused, B would not occur. 
Plainly, causation*, as defined by (C*), is a genus of which timeless 
sustenance, as defined by (5*), is a species. If the latter relation exists, 
then (since it simply obeys fewer constraints), so does the former. But 
(C*) shows that the problem of effects is serious. For, in the sense 
defined by (C*) (which is after all essentially Lewis' definition), it will be 
true that the coming-to-be of the world caused God to command it.48 
The result generalizes, in fact, to all the effects of divine commands. 
Leftow can perhaps deny that (C*) defines a causal relation, even if he 
allows that it defines some sort of relation. But such a denial could only 
be motivated, I think, by its dialectical advantages, not by any funda-
mental comprehension of causation. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing near cousin of (C*): 
(C**) A causes** B =df. (i) A and B occur contingently, (ij) A 
occurs temporally and B occurs timelessly, (iii) in every non-
actual world W such that no world is more like the actnal world 
than W, A occurs only if B occurs, and (iv) were A not to occur, 
then if B's occurrence is not overdetermined or redundantly 
caused, then B would not do so. 
(C**) defines what looks like a causal relation on the model of (5*), 
except that the causal direction goes from world to God. B might be 
God's hearing a petitionary prayer, in which case (C**) might seem an 
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acceptable definition in the spirit of (5*). But any willing contingently 
performed by God - e.g., His freely willing the creation of the world -
will equally count as a substitution-instance for B in (C**). Like (5*), 
(C**) avoids the problem of effects, and in precisely the same way. 
Leftow can't deny that (C**) has instances: as just noted, it applies to 
God's "creation" of the world. 50 he must deny - on some a priori 
grounds or general account of the metaphysics of causation - that (C**) 
defines a causal relation. But what grounds for that can he give? He 
thinks it just "intuitive" that temporal facts can't timelessly condition 
timeless ones. Of course I agree. But isn't it equally intuitive that a 
timeless fact, such as that 2+2=4, can't causally condition anything at all? 
Though I cannot claim to have covered here every conceivable analy-
sis of causation by means of which theists might hope to escape the con-
clusion that an eternal God would, of necessity, be a do-nothing deity, it 
does seem to me that the prospects look quite unpromising. 
2. Actions of a temporal God 
I conclude that Gale and Pike are most likely correct in supposing that 
theists who locate God in eternity have an impotent deity on their 
hands. Indeed, troubles for divine causation do not end if God is 
returned to the temporal sphere. For God, it is almost universally sup-
posed, is at least not a spatial being; and among theists it is also stan-
dardly held that God created the material world, and the space contain-
ing it, ex nihilo. But each of these claims - that God is a non-spatial being, 
and that matter can be brought into being from nothing that is itself spa-
tiotemporal - is dubious and requires at least a considerable stretching of 
our ordinary conception of causality. But here intuitions waver, and it 
can be argued that our understanding of causation is not really deep 
enough, yet, to rule out decisively the envisioned possibilities:9 
Besides these difficulties, there is another which must be confronted 
by theists who hold that God is a temporal being who interacts causally 
with the world. 5uch interaction entails that information-bearing signals 
pass between God and the world; as a result, it must be possible to spec-
ify for God a temporal reference frame. How then is God's activity to be 
understood in terms of, or at least brought into conformity with, 5TR? 
According to 5TR, a spatiotemporal reference frame is determined by 
the nature of the causal interactions (signal transmissions) possible 
between items at rest in it and other items in the world. Because God 
does not have a spatial location, it is not possible to speak of his being 
"at rest" with respect to some set of spatial coordinates; nor can we 
speak literally of theophysical causal interactions in terms of signal 
transmission from one place to another. It is most natural, perhaps, to 
think of God as omnipresent; that is, locally present at (in the sense that 
He can immediately influence) every point in physical space. I do not 
think that this suggestion can be squared with both 5TR and other theis-
tic commitments; however, that is not what I wish to discuss here. My 
present concern is with how God's actions are temporally coordinated 
with mundane clocks. 
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William Craig has argued that God endures through absolute time, 
defined by a temporal coordinate that is independent of local motion 
and that occupies a unique position with respect to the cosmos as a 
whole.50 Craig's arguments for this thesis are two-pronged. On the one 
hand, he offers a metaphysical argument - he calls God's time metaphys-
ical time, and distinguishes metaphysical from measured time. On the 
other hand, he appeals to recent physical measurements of the cosmic 
background radiation which suggest that an absolute reference frame, 
one which bears a unique relation to the cosmos, is empirically 
detectable. 
If this latter claim proves to be correct, then it is plausible to identify 
God's time with the measured cosmic time. But Craig's first argument-
the metaphysical one - cannot by itself bear the weight he places on it. 
Craig's metaphysical argument consists in an attack upon what he 
takes to be the verificationist conceptual underpinnings of STR. 
Specifically, he takes Einstein's operational definition of simultaneity in 
terms of the constant one-way speed of light to reflect a commitment to 
the verificationist theory of meaning, i.e. to the view that to speak or 
think about absolute time is to lapse into meaninglessness. In view of 
his later explicit rejection of positivism, and in spite of some of his earli-
er phrasing and the evident influence of Mach, I find it doubtful that 
Einstein seriously meant to be making claims about what it is (literally) 
meaningful to say. Or perhaps his philosophical intuitions on this point 
were a bit muddled. But no matter: a defense of Einstein's "definition" 
of simultaneity can be given which makes no specious appeal to verifica-
tionist notions of meaning, but which does capture Einstein's basic 
insight and reflects scientific practice in general. 
Such a defense proceeds, not by appeal to any semantic principle, but 
to one which coordinates epistemology with ontology. I shall call it the 
Principle of Causal Closure. The basic idea is that we can (in principle) 
detect (or measure) all and only those items which causally interact with 
some part of "our world," and that it is only such things that can make 
any difference to what our world is like. The rough idea needs to be 
more carefully articulated. It consists of two theses. One is that the 
world (our world) consists solely of parts that are causally connected or 
causally connectable; i.e., that nothing which is causally isolated from 
every part of our world - the set of items to which we are or can be 
causally related - is part of our world. We can take this simply to stipu-
latively define what is meant by "our world." But it has an important 
consequence. Given the transitivity of the causal relation, it follows 
from the fact that e is or could be causally related to something in our 
world, that it is or could be causally related to us. Concretely: if e inter-
acts with something in the world, we can in principle get it to interact 
with us, hence we can in principle detect or measure it. Conversely: If 
we can't detect or measure e, then it bears no causal relation to anything 
in our world.51 
We cannot know about any physical thing that we cannot detect or 
measure. But the result just obtained entails that such a thing would be 
causally isolated from our world. What we can't know about, it is not 
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the business of science to pursue. But that is no loss to science: what is 
causally isolated from our world can make no difference to it whatever. 
It does not affect the operation of our world, either as a boundary condi-
tion or as a phenomenon that the laws governing our world must 
account for. From the perspective of physics and of our world, it is a 
nothing. 52 This is the second thesis. There may be universes not causally 
connected to ours. There may be such a small universe three inches in 
front of my nose right now. But these worlds are not our worlds. Our 
measuring techniques cannot penetrate them, and their existence makes 
no difference to the things we can measure. 
What I've said about events goes, by way of a corollary, for the prop-
erties they instantiate as well. A property or relation, instances of which 
are not detectable by physical means, is a property that plays no causal 
role in the world's economy. Thus, in particular, a type of temporal 
"simultaneity" which is not measurable is not a relation that can play 
any role in physics, because it is not a relation which affects the physical 
events in our world, if they stand in it. If, then, God stands in causal 
relations to mundane events, the simultaneity relations between events 
in His temporal reference frame and any given mundane frame of refer-
ence must be determinable in terms of the transmission of these theo-
physical "signals." So if God's actions have physically specifiable effects 
upon our world, it must be possible to bring God's "metaphysical" time 
into (temporal) relation with mundane temporal frames. A temporal 
God whose time is not thus relatable to mundane times is a nothing to 
us. Einstein's basic insight stands. 
On the other hand, if divine time is measurable by us - as it would be 
if it could be identified with or correlated to a frame defined by the cos-
mic background radiation - then there is no impediment here to the the-
istic hypothesis of a God who is causally active in this world. So let us 
allow that a temporal God, endowed with the other characteristics the-
ists take Him to have, is capable of the sorts of actions typically attrib-
uted to Him. 
3. Science and God 
It was not, after all, my plan to show that God is impotent, but rather to 
investigate the conditions under which one could defend the claim that 
He is beyond the reach of scientific investigation. And I have been sug-
gesting that, if God is eternal, and if an eternal being cannot causally inter-
act with the world, this would certainly render Him immune from scien-
tific investigation. It is easy to see that it would, indeed, so isolate God 
from human cognitive faculties as to make impossible any knowledge of 
Him, of an a posteriori kind.53 If, on this supposition, there is any knowl-
edge of God to be had, it must be sought in a priori reasoning alone. 
But there remains the other prong of the question: if God can and 
does54 causally interact with the world, might there be some way of 
defending the claim that He nevertheless lies outside of the domain of 
scientific understanding? 
One way to achieve this result would be simply to rule that the prop-
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er subject matter for scientific inquiry is limited to the spatiotemporal 
world. But why should science accept such an arbitrary stipulation con-
cerning the boundaries of its domain? There is an alternative - and in 
this context less tendentious - characterization of the field proper to sci-
entific inquiry, viz., that the challenge to which it addresses itself 
includes (at least") the task of discovering what causes what. 
It has always been central to the mission of science to seek as com-
plete and comprehensive an understanding of the causal structure of 
things as it is possible to achieve. Although science does more than seek 
to provide causal explanations, that, surely, is one of its tasks. If some 
natural phenomenon is supernaturally caused, it would be an unaccept-
able and arbitrary limitation on scientific inquiry (unless it can be shown 
that there are features intrinsic to the relevant scientific methods - i.e., to 
any method that is demonstrably reliable in discovering causes - and to 
the supernatural itself, which preclude in principle such an investiga-
tion) to slam the door shut here and say: you can go no further. 
Of course, it might be that non-spatiotemporal entities can't cause, or 
be causally affected by, anything; in which case the alternative character-
ization I've offered assigns to science no larger a domain than does the 
first one. But in that case, we are returned to the first prong of the ques-
tion. If God interacts with the world, then science must be permitted to 
ask what causes the observed effects of His activity. 
To fix ideas, suppose that every Saturday at sunrise, God were to 
move Mt. Ararat ten kilometers to the east and at sunrise on every 
Sunday, to return it to its original location. We may be sure that geolo-
gists would waste no time studying the phenomenon. But all attempts 
to trace a chain of purely natural causes would, in this case, end in fail-
ure. Why then should the hypothesis of a supernatural cause be 
debarred from consideration? 
It might be thought that such a hypothesis must be excluded because 
science can't manipulate or control supernatural causes. But scientific 
understanding is certainly possible where manipulation is beyond our 
reach. There are a great many natural phenomena into which we pos-
sess scientific insight, over which we have no control. 
Or it might be supposed that science must confine itself to causes that 
can be directly observed, or observed by the bodily senses, whereas the 
divine cannot be so observed. But this brand of empiricism not only fails 
to respect the way scientists typically understand the theoretical dimen-
sions of their enterprise; it also runs aground upon the task of specifying 
what it is to observe something "directly" (as opposed - presumably - to 
obtaining evidence for it via its effects). Nothing is more natural in sci-
ence than entertaining hypotheses concerning "unobservable" entities, 
and reasoning from effects to causes. Thus to exclude supernatural 
hypotheses on this ground would be to reject perhaps the most funda-
mental inferential procedure in science - abductive reasoning.56 
Third, it might be suggested that God cannot be subjected to scientific 
scrutiny because, as master of the universe, he is not subject to the laws 
of nature. But that does not prevent God from acting in conformity with 
the laws of nature. God could not literally violate the laws of nature,'7 
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though He could make a world that does not always behave in pat-
terned ways. Such a world might be harder to study scientifically, but if 
causes operate in that world, they would be proper topics of scientific 
inquiry. 
Finally, it might be thought that it would be unsound methodology 
for science to admit supernaturalistic hypotheses. As Stephen Weinberg 
puts it, 
... the only way that any sort of science can proceed is to 
assume that there is no divine intervention and to see how far 
one can get with this assumption.58 
This is a more cogent worry, for there are certain methodological dan-
gers lurking here. They are, however, dangers of practice rather than of 
principle, and at most what they show is that we should try very hard to 
discover naturalistic explanations for a phenomenon, before entertaining 
seriously any supernaturalistic hypothesis. 
The principle danger which arises in this connection is that of allow-
ing into science a god-of-the-gaps strategy, a strategy which would per-
mit adoption of a supernaturalistic explanation for a phenomenon when 
no presently available naturalistic hypothesis seems satisfactory, but 
where the supernaturalistic hypothesis has not itself received any posi-
tive independent confirmation. Supernaturalistic explanations are 
sometimes offered which are too vague, or too sketchy about the details 
of the operative mechanisms, to permit their being tested. Perhaps this 
is why Weinberg thinks of theistic hypotheses as (at best) a last resort. 
But there is no reason why supernaturalistic explanations should not be 
held to the same standards as other causal explanations, and no reason 
in principle, so far as I can see, why they could not be so developed as to 
meet those standards. 59 
There is, nevertheless, an important tradition in twentieth-century 
theology60 which largely eschews - even rejects - natural theology on the 
grounds that any proof of God's existence would coerce belief and leave 
no room for a freely chosen faith. According to this view, God offers 
humans a few carefully chosen hints of His presence, but makes sure to 
leave no traces which are sufficiently unmistakable to encroach upon the 
domain of faith. 
I believe this position to be founded upon distorted and mistaken 
conceptions of both belief and freedom; but it does raise a theoretical 
possibility that is nevertheless worth consideration. God is so vastly 
more clever and powerful than we are that, were it for whatever reason 
to suit His purposes to follow a policy of dangling obscure hints before 
human beings, or of working in complete secrecy, and never revealing 
His presence in a way open to scientific scrutiny, then surely He would 
be able to carry that policy out. Science - our science - is a human enter-
prise, and whatever its power in theory, it is limited after all by the lim-
its of human intelligence and physical resources, lucky observations, 
and the like. God could remain hidden, though all the while interacting 
with the world in a multitude of ways. 
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There is no denying that a hidden God is a genuine possibility. If 
remaining beyond the reach of science is God's policy, then no doubt we 
shall indeed fail in any scientific effort to track Him down. But then, we 
shall fail to have any knowledge of God, period. Faith, understood as a 
strong confidence61 not supported by good evidence, may arguably serve 
as a religiously satisfactory substitute, but it is in no sense cognitively or 
epistemically able to replace knowledge. 
So long as God chooses to remain hidden, we shall remain in igno-
rance. To the extent that He reveals himself, on the other hand, we may 
obtain some justification for beliefs about His existence and activities. In 
either case, it is perfectly open to science to pursue the issue, by every 
means at its disposal. 
I think we can go a bit further. One need not be guilty of worship-
ping science, or of a misplaced confidence that science can solve every 
problem and answer every question, to recognize the hardly controver-
sial fact that the various disciplines within science have collectively 
developed and applied, with a degree of sophistication, precision, and 
success elsewhere unmatched, a set of tools designed to ferret out causes 
and effects. It is only through His discoverable effects upon us and our 
world that we can gain knowledge of God. Thus it is to science that we 
should turn for the best answers to theological questions. If science can-
not supply those answers, what can?62,6J 
University of Iowa 
NOTES 
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16. Stump and Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 439. 
17. Leftow, op. cit., pp. 172-178 recognizes and develops this difficulty. 
The point might be clarified by observing that the rationale which supports 
the Lorentz transformations in STR does not merely give rise to the idea that 
simultaneity is a three-place, as opposed to a two-place, relation. That ratio-
nale turns fundamentally on the precise nature of the interactions causally 
possible between distant observers, and hence upon the laws of signal trans-
mission. In fact, in the limiting case in which the speed of transmission is 
permitted to be infinite, the simultaneity relation effectively reduces to a 
two-place relation, which shows that the number of places the relation takes 
is parasitic upon, and less basic than, the causal laws governing signal trans-
mission. So, just as Einstein's reasoning required independent assumptions 
concerning the causal processes governing electromagnetic phenomena, 
Stump and Kretzmann would have to make independent assumptions 
about the processes governing signal transmission between an eternal refer-
ence frame and a temporal one, for the reasoning supporting the notion of 
ET-simultaneity remotely to resemble that which generates STR. 
One could, conceivably, propose a causal theory of time/ eternity accord-
ing to which causation is the more fundamental notion ontologically. The 
possibility of theophysical causal relations would then perhaps not hinge 
upon temporal considerations at all; and temporal or quasi-temporal rela-
tions between eternity and the world could then ride piggy-back upon the 
causal relations. But that is not Stump and Kretzmann's procedure; and I 
have no idea how it would go. (But see further note 36). 
18. Stump and Kretzmann, "Eternity, Awareness, and Action," pp. 477-
478. I have omitted from (ii) and (iii) a clause concerning the immediate 
awareness A and B can have, if conscious, of x and y. 
19. Stump and Kretzmann, "Eternity, Awareness, and Action," p. 475. 
20. Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
(1991). 
21. Leftow, op. cit., p. 222. 
22. Leftow, op. cit., p. 227. 
23. William Craig disputes this inference of Leftow's in "The Special 
Theory of Relativity and Theories of Divine Eternity," Faith and Philosophy 11 
(1994), pp. 19-37. 
24. Craig, Ibid., largely relieves me of this task; readers are referred to his 
article. Leftow does not comment on the modal status of (M), given 
Minkowskian space-time. But it seems there could be change without 
motion in a Minkowskian world, even if (M) happens to be true in the actual 
world. 
25. Craig, Ibid. also makes this point. 
26. Yet Leftow, op. cit., p. 225 actually accepts such bizarre conclusions as 
that three, and the color yellow, are contiguous to every spatial location. 
27. 'Is not subject to affective states' doesn't denote an emotional charac-
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teristic; equally, 'is not distant from anything' doesn't denote a spatial rela-
tion. Leftow himself uses a similar argument against Stump and Kretzmann 
at Leftow, op. cit., p. 175. 
28. Leftow, op. cit., p. 226. 
29. Leftow, op. cit., p. 245. 
30. Leftow, op. cit., pp. 291-292. 
31. An anonymous referee has suggested on Leftow's behalf that, even 
given the Zero Thesis, perhaps it can be denied that God's actions are locally 
simultaneous with spatiotemporal events, thereby blocking the move from 
divine actions' being simultaneous in the eternal frame of reference to their 
effects' being simultaneous in temporal reference-frames. But for Leftow to 
argue thus would simply reinforce the charge that his use of (ZT) requires 
an equivocation on whether the negation is internal or external. 
32. A small sampler of excluded analyses includes those of Kant, C. J. 
Ducasse, Nature, Mind, and Death, LaSalle: Open Court, 1951, Wesley 
Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984, and J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: 
A Study of Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. 
33. But see, e.g., David Armstrong, A Theory of Universals, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 153-154. Interestingly, Armstrong 
slips a couple of pages later (p. 156) when, apparently ignoring the fact that 
God is nonspatial, he reflects upon the intelligibility of miracles in terms of 
his analysis of causation. But he is quite right to think that his analysis has 
promise at least as a way of understanding the actions of a temporal God. 
34. Indeed here lurks the problem of explaining divine sovereignty over 
the laws of nature. But let us set aside that puzzle. 
35. This theme clearly requires further development, which I shall 
attempt elsewhere. 
36. A referee has suggested that God need not fix reference on times, 
provided that a causal theory of time is true. All He needs to do in that case 
is timelessly to will a causal sequence of events, whose causal relations will 
then ground their temporal relations. For a deist, this might be a viable way 
to conceive of divine causation. For a theist, at least one who is also a liber-
tarian with respect to human action, it is less clear to me how it would suc-
ceed. That depends upon whether God can locate in the causal order free 
human actions, which are arguably not a part of that order, so as to respond 
to them. 
In any case, there appears to be a more fundamental difficulty with this 
strategy. A causal theorist might accept a B-theory of time, and ground the 
earlier/later-than relation in the cause/effect relation. Alternatively, one could 
adopt an A-theory of time and a non-Humean analysis of causation, 
grounding temporal becoming in causal production. In the first case, it will 
then turn out that God's causing a mundane event-sequence by willing it 
entails that this sequence occurs later than God's willing. The second sort of 
theory, on the other hand, establishes a relation of temporal becoming 
between divine acts of willing and their effects. Thus both theories imply 
temporal relations between divine acts and spatiotemporal events, and so 
neither is acceptable to the position that God is eternal. 
37. Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988, p. 68. 
38. Leftow, op. cit., pp. 291-295. 
39. Leftow, op. cit., p. 293, following David Lewis, "Causation," in Lewis, 
Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 
166-167. 
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40. Leftow, op. cit., p. 294. 
41. See the sections 'Preemption' and 'Redundant Causation' in Lewis, 
op. cit. What Leftow calls redundant causation, Lewis calls preemption; 
Lewis uses 'redundant causation' as a generic term that covers both preemp-
tion and overdetermination. Lewis' analysis of preemption invokes a move 
that he employs also to solve the problem of effects - for which see below - a 
move which Leftow must reject. So Leftow owes us an alternative counter-
factual analysis. To be sure, it is unclear just how thoroughgoing a commit-
ment to a Lewis-style analysis of causation Leftow wishes to embrace. He 
says that "if some counterfactual analysis of causation can be adequate, then 
(S*) either is or can with further complications develop into a viable analysis 
of a timeless being's sustaining causation of a temporal being's existence." 
(op. cit., p. 294) Now this is a conditional claim - but if Leftow rejects Lewis' 
analysis, then we would need to be informed what analysis of ordinary tem-
poral causation he has to offer. 
42. For a recent criticism of Lewis, see Daniel M. Hausman, "Causation 
and Counterfactual Dependence Reconsidered," Nous 30 (1996), pp. 55-74. 
43. Lest it be thought that the argument trades on the problematic modal 
status of the antecedents and consequents of this example, I give here sever-
al other examples. (1) 'Abraham's argument caused God to spare Lot' might 
be understood in terms of 'If Abraham hadn't so argued, Lot would not 
have been saved by God.' (Here the causal direction is from world to God.) 
How is the counterfactual to be evaluated? If Abraham had remained silent, 
would God have carried out his expressed intention to slay every Sodomite? 
Or would God, foreseeing Abraham's silence and recognizing the injustice 
of murdering Lot, never have declared, let alone executed, such an inten-
tion? (2) 'God the Son's appearing to Paul on the road to Damascus caused 
Paul to become a Christian' might be analyzed as, 'If God the Son had not 
appeared to Paul on the road to Damascus, Paul would not have converted.' 
But what exactly are the conditions under which this counterfactual is to be 
evaluated? (3) Or, even more dramatically, consider the claim that 'God the 
Son's appearing to Paul caused Christianity to become a world religion' 
which might be analyzed as 'If God the Son had not appeared to Paul, 
Christianity would never have become a world religion' (and which, togeth-
er with certain historical facts, supports the plausible claim that Christianity 
would have remained a minor Judean sect, persevering less than 150 years). 
It should be clear that in all these cases, it is not clear whether the counter-
factual is true or false, because it is unclear what ancillary conditions are to 
be "held fixed" when it is evaluated. 
44. See Lewis, op. cit., p. 170. 
45. That is, suppose that, given the circumstances, (cD~e), from which it 
apparently follows that (-eD~-c). 
46. Lewis, op. cit., p. 170. 
47. Or a close analogue, depending on whether or not one takes there to 
be a nomic connection between God's commands and their effects. 
48. Since Lewis' own defensive strategy is unavailable to the theist. 
49. Stump and Kretzmann think that a theist who allows that non-spatial 
God can be metaphysically present to spatial beings ought equally to allow 
that eternal God can be metaphysically present to temporal beings; see 
"Eternity, Awareness, and Action," p. 476). But if metaphysical presence 
involves causal connectedness, it is unclear that the two cases are parallel. 
50. Craig, "God and Real Time,," Religious Studies 26 (1990), pp. 335-359. 
51. Causal connectedness in the sense meant here can be highly indirect. 
Our world consists of thing which can causally influence us and our mea-
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suring instruments, things which we can causally influence, and things to 
which we are or can become connected via a causal fork - that is to say, 
events whose causal antecedents can be traced back to some event which is 
a causal ancestor of something which affects or can affect us. When I speak 
of what we can or cannot do in this context, I mean what is physically possi-
ble or impossible for us - i.e., consistent with, or inconsistent with, the laws 
of nature. 
52. This principle is not to be confused with a stronger principle, one we 
might call the Principle of Causal Parsimony. The stronger principle is an 
ontological one. It says that there do not exist any entities or events which 
are in principle undetectable, because causally isolated from our world. 
This is not a trivial principle: it conflicts, for example, with David Lewis' 
realist attitude toward possible worlds. I know of no way to demonstrate 
this stronger principle. It is not a meaningless assertion that there are such 
entities or events, though I do think that individuation and singular refer-
ence to items of this kind are precluded. 
53. It would also evacuate theism of most of its religious and metaphysi-
cal interest. 
54. I take it that if God can interact with the world but doesn't, then we 
are effectively in the same cognitive position vis a vis Him as we are if He 
can't interact. But I also take it that no theist would accept the view that 
theophysical causation is possible but not actual. 
55. Science may well include tasks other than those of tracing the web of 
causal interactions and patterns which "cement" together our universe, and 
of providing causal explanations. But it includes at least these undertakings. 
56. Whatever opinion one may have of the strengths or weaknesses of 
the a posteriori arguments for the existence of God, they all trade on precisely 
this form of inference. 
57. God could not make it the case both that all A's are B's, and that 
some A is a non-B. 
58. Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory, New York: Pantheon Books, 
1992, p. 247. 
59. What kind of evidence would support scientific reasoning to the con-
clusion that a divine action upon or interaction with the world has 
occurred? It is not my task here to specify what such evidence would be, or 
even to argue that there could be such evidence, but only to argue that if the 
evidence exists, our primary appeal should be to science to evaluate it. But I 
see no reason to think that nothing could count as evidence of the right sort. 
In "On Miracles," American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968), pp. 130-134, Paul 
Deitl has given a vivid depiction of one imaginable case. I discuss the ques-
tion whether mystical experiences can provide evidence of this sort in Fales, 
"Scientific Explanations of Mystical Experience, Part I: The Case of St. 
Teresa," and "Scientific Explanations of Mystical Experience, Part II: The 
Challenge to Theism," Religious Studies 32 (1996), pp. 143-163 and 297-313 
respectively; and in "Mystical Experience as Evidence," International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 40, (1996), pp. 19-46. But I reach the conclusion that 
such experiences provide at best extremely weak evidence for theism. In 
general, I endorse what I take to be the central point of Hume's discussion of 
miracles - namely, that a theistic explanation of an event is plausible to the 
degree that it outstrips all non-theistic explanations. Thus, an event - e.g., 
the translocation of Mt. Ararat - may even be an unlikely thing for God to 
do, and yet confirm theism, provided no other (equally good) explanation 
for its occurrence can be found. 
One critic has suggested that I should speak here of rational grounds 
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rather than scientific grounds for theism, since science concerns itself only 
with natural phenomena. There is the danger here of a quibble over words. 
I would merely observe that this sort of investigation, at its best, would use 
scientific methods of data collection and evaluation, and scientific reasoning 
to confirm or disconfirm any adequately articulated theistic hypothesis. In 
view of this, I see no reason not to call the inquiry a scientific one. I might 
add that although in principle nothing much hangs on our terminology 
here, there are practical implications that cannot be ignored: scientists all 
too often, all too conveniently, and sometimes disingenuously abdicate the 
responsibility to investigate such matters, or to draw out the implications of 
their scientific work for theism, citing the shibboleth that on these questions 
science must remain silent. They should not be let off the hook so easily. 
60. Principally among liberal Protestant theologians. Its roots can be 
traced to the influence of Kierkegaard. 
61. Here I mean confidence that some proposition is true. 
62. In the Middle Ages, theology was considered to be the queen of the 
sciences. I suggest that in our age, this adage needs to be inverted. In the 
search for theological understanding, science is queen. There is more to the-
ology than grasping the relevant natural and supernatural facts; but without 
a grasp of those facts, there is no logos of the theos at all. 
63. I would like to thank Brian Leftow, William Craig, and two anony-
mous referees for their very helpful comments. They have saved me from 
several errors. 
